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LET’S FACE FACTS, THESE MOUNTAINS WON’T GROW
BACK:1 REDUCING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF
MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL COAL MINING IN
APPALACHIA
DIANA KANEVA*

INTRODUCTION
The Appalachian Mountains are over 300 million years old and
are home to one of the most diverse ecosystems on the planet.2 In recent
years, their beauty has been overshadowed by vast strips of moonscape
plateaus, resulting from extensive mountaintop removal coal mining
operations.3 As many as 500 mountain peaks have been obliterated, and
2000 miles of waterways have been permanently lost under valley fills
formed during mining activities and post-mining reclamation efforts.4
This note will discuss the environmental impacts of mountaintop removal mining in Appalachia, trace the largely unsuccessful efforts that
have been made to date to ameliorate these impacts, and conclude with
policy proposals for eliminating, or at least reducing, the devastation
caused by mountaintop removal.

1
Contra The Colbert Report: Coal Comfort—Margaret Palmer (Comedy Central television
broadcast Jan. 18, 2010), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report
-videos/261997/January-18-2010/coal-comfort---margaret-palmer (“You’re all antimountaintop removal, but let’s face facts, these mountains will grow back.”).
*
J.D. Candidate, 2011, William & Mary School of Law. I would like to thank my family
and friends for their constant support in all of my academic endeavors, the ELPR staff for
their hard work in producing this publication, and the people of Appalachia and their defenders for their courage and persistence in fighting the battle against mountaintop removal.
2
See Wilma Dykeman, Appalachian Mountains, BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/30353/Appalachian-Mountains (last visited
Apr. 4, 2011).
3
See Mark Baller & Leor Joseph Pantilat, Comment, Defenders of Appalachia: The
Campaign to Eliminate Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining and the Role of Public
Justice, 37 ENVTL. L. 629, 630 (2007).
4
Sue Sturgis, Mountaintop Removal Mining Study Will Test Obama’s Commitment to
Science, FACING SOUTH: THE ONLINE MAG. OF THE INST. FOR SOUTHERN STUD. (Jan. 10,
2010, 8:18 PM), http://www.southernstudies.org/2010/01/mountaintop-removal-mining
-study-will-test-obamas-commitment-to-science.html.
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Part I of this note will present a brief technical description of
mountaintop removal and delineate the scope of the problems caused by
the practice. The section will address, in turn, the environmental impacts
on vegetation, animal ecosystems, waterways, and human communities.
It will then shift to the economic impact of mountaintop removal and
focus on the tension between electricity, jobs, and a green environment
in what is one of the poorest regions in America.
Part II of this note will trace and assess efforts made to alleviate
the problems of mountaintop removal through various institutional
means. The section will include a review and analysis of pertinent federal
legislation, law enforcement, judicial action, and constraints on regulation
posed by politics and agency capture by the coal mining industry.
Finally, Part III of this note will propose and address the feasibility of various non-mutually-exclusive measures that can be implemented
to eliminate the problems exposed in Part II. These measures will include: tightening the existent framework of laws and regulations;
strengthening law enforcement; facilitating increased judicial action;
severing the connection between the coal industry and policymakers;
focusing on reclamation; re-conceptualizing the problem in terms of
public health; and completely banning mountaintop removal. The last
Part of this note will provide a brief conclusion, emphasizing the urgent
need for multi-institutional change of mountaintop removal policy.
I.

THE PROBLEM WITH MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL COAL MINING

A.

Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining Defined

Mountaintop removal (“MTR”) is one of several surface methods
of coal mining, utilized predominantly in the Appalachian mountains.5
Although MTR was known as early as the 1960s, it did not become a
dominant form of coal mining in Appalachia until the 1990s when increased demand for high-grade low-sulfur coal forced the industry to seek
more efficient and profitable means of coal extraction.6

5

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MOUNTAINTOP MINING/VALLEY FILLS IN APPALACHIA: FINAL
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 2 (2005) [hereinafter FPEIS].
6
MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31819, U.S. COAL: A PRIMER ON THE
MAJOR ISSUES 25 (2003); see also Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to
Mountaintop Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL.
L. 21, 57 (2004); Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 631–32.
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As the name implies, the method involves removing tops of mountains, frequently as much as 800 to 1000 feet, in order to gain access to
the seams of coal lying beneath.7 After the target terrain is deforested,
removal is accomplished by blasting the mountaintop with explosives.8
The removed material or “spoil,” consisting mostly of soil and broken
rock, is hauled away and later, following completion of the mining operation, replaced.9 However, the disruption of the rock results in significant
expansion of the spoil by as much as fifteen to twenty-five percent due to
voids and air incorporation.10 This process is known as “swelling” and the
excess material is referred to as “excess spoil” or “overburden.”11 Because
stability concerns limit the amount of expanded or de-compacted spoil
that can be returned to the mountaintop, the overburden is pushed into
the adjacent valleys, creating permanent “valley fills,” which can be as
much as 1000 feet wide and several miles long.12
B.

Environmental Impact

MTR has been described as the activity responsible for “the
greatest amount of environmental destruction caused by a single type of
activity in the country today . . . .”13 From deforestation to air pollution,
destruction of wildlife, and permanent loss of waterways, the effects of
MTR on the environment are multifaceted.14
1.

Impact on Vegetation and Animal Life

The process of MTR begins with large-scale deforestation.15 One
estimate suggests that as of 2007 over 300 square miles of forest have
been destroyed as a result of MTR in Appalachia.16 Another study conducted by the government, focusing on an area of approximately twelve
7

Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 631.
See id.
9
See Zoe Gamble, Note, Injustice in the Fourth Circuit: Bragg v. West Virginia Coal
Association Is Moving Mountains for Industry, 30 VT. L. REV. 393, 395 (2006).
10
Id. at 395–96; Sara Clark, In the Shadow of the Fourth Circuit: Ohio Valley
Environmental Coalition v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q.
143, 144 (2008).
11
Gamble, supra note 9, at 396.
12
See id.
13
Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 630 (quoting Jim Hecker).
14
See infra Part I.B.1–3.
15
Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 632.
16
Id. at 633.
8
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million acres and encompassing parts of Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Tennessee, showed that almost seven percent of the forested study
area “has been or may be affected by recent and future (1992–2012)
mountaintop mining.”17 Although the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”) requires that upon completion of mining operations, the land be reclaimed and returned to its original condition as
much as possible,18 large-scale reforestation has not taken place.19 Instead, the terrain, if replanted at all, has generally been replanted with
various non-native species of grasses, which are both cheaper and easier
to grow.20 Because trees are vital for removing carbon dioxide from the
air and minimizing soil erosion, their destruction is catastrophic to
the environment.21
Replacing the once luscious forests with grasslands has devastating consequences on the surrounding wildlife as well.22 The Appalachian
forests “support some of the highest biodiversity in North America,
including several endangered species.”23 Once the forests are gone, so too
is the wildlife.24 Studies have suggested that entire species of forest
songbirds have been depleted and replaced by grassland birds.25 Similarly, amphibians, such salamanders, have been replaced by reptiles,

17

FPEIS, supra note 5, at 2, 4. This study was conducted as part of a settlement
agreement in Bragg v. Robertson. Id. at 1. It was prepared jointly by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (“Corps”), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the U.S.
Department of Interior’s Office of Surface Mining (“OSM”), Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”), and the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”). Id.
Although the study does not examine the entire geographic area subject to this note, it
is one of the few rigorous scientific studies on the subject and is used here as a
representative illustration of the effects of MTR on the Appalachian mountains. The area
explored in the study includes eastern Kentucky, southern West Virginia, western
Virginia, and parts of eastern Tennessee, amounting to a total of 12 million acres and
approximately 59,000 miles of streams. Id. at 2.
18
See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006); see
infra Part II.A.1.
19
See FPEIS, supra note 5, at 47.
20
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE EFFECTS OF MOUNTAINTOP MINES AND VALLEY
FILLS ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL APPALACHIAN COALFIELDS 63 (2009)
[hereinafter EFFECTS OF MOUNTAINTOP MINES] (external review draft).
21
See Appalachian Regional Reforestation Initiative, Importance of This Initiative,
OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION & ENFORCEMENT, http://arri.osmre.gov/
About/Importance.shtm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
22
Margaret A. Palmer et al., Mountaintop Mining Consequences, 327 SCI. 148, 148 (2010).
23
Id.
24
See id.
25
See FPEIS, supra note 5, at 4.
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such as snakes.26 These troublesome trends are a sign of the gradual
destruction of biodiversity in the area.27
The destructive impact on vegetation and animal life is further
compounded by stream elimination and pollution.28 The perturbing shift
towards less diverse and more pollution-tolerant species is particularly
visible in fish.29 Elevated concentrations of sulfates and selenium in
waterways, among other pollutants produced during MTR activities,
have toxic effects on many aquatic organisms.30 Excess selenium levels,
for example, “cause teratogenic deformities in larval fish . . . .”31 In a
chain reaction of environmental destruction, birds, which feed on the
fish, are then affected and face reproductive failure.32
2.

Impact on Waterways

Perhaps the most pronounced and significant environmental
impact of MTR is that on waterways.33 Waterways are impacted in at
least two ways: first, they are directly buried and consequently permanently destroyed when overburden is dumped in the valleys;34 and
second, they are polluted by toxic materials produced and released
during mining operations.35 One estimate suggests that over 1200 miles
of rivers and streams had been buried under valley fills as of 2007.36 This
figure is supported by a Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (“FPEIS”) released by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”), which found that two percent of the streams in the study
area, or approximately 1200 out of 59,000 miles of streams, were directly
impacted by valley fills and other byproducts of MTR between 1992 and
2002.37 More recently, the figure has been increased to as much as 2000

26

See id.
See Palmer et al., supra note 22, at 148.
28
See infra Part I.B.2.
29
See FPEIS, supra note 5, at 4, 44.
30
See Palmer et al., supra note 22, at 148.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
See Bryan C. Banks, Note, High Above the Environmental Decimation and Economic
Domination of Eastern Kentucky, King Coal Remains Firmly Seated on Its Gilded Throne,
13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 142 (2006).
34
Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 632.
35
See Banks, supra note 33, at 142–43.
36
Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 633.
37
FPEIS, supra note 5, at 2, 4.
27
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miles of streams lost as of 2010.38 Furthermore, as the EPA recently
observed in a draft report,
Permits already approved from 1992 through 2002 are
projected, when fully implemented, to result in the loss of
1,944 km of headwater streams. This represents a loss of
almost two percent of the stream miles in the focal area
(KY, TN, WV, and VA), a length that is more than triple
the length of the Potomac River, just during this 10-yearperiod.39
Water pollution is another critical consequence of MTR in
Appalachia.40 Toxic chemicals such as arsenic, mercury, chromium,
selenium, nickel, and boron are released in the water during mining
operations.41 Acid mine drainage, high in sulfuric acid, is particularly
detrimental to the environment.42 As a result of water toxicity, fish
communities are changed or lost, and the aquatic ecosystem becomes
sterile.43
3.

Impact on Human Communities

It is estimated that, “[i]n all, 1.4 million acres of the region’s land,
home to people and wildlife, have been impacted by mountaintop
mining—constituting an area of the size of Delaware.”44 MTR has pronounced effects on human communities, with varying degrees of impact
on human health.45 Residents of communities in close proximity to mines
are forced to constantly endure explosive noise, omnipresent dust particles, poisoned water supplies, and frequent flooding.46
38

Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Issues Comprehensive Guidance to
Protect Appalachian Communities from Harmful Environmental Impacts of Mountain
Top Mining (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/
upload/2010_04_10_wetlands_guidance_appalachian_mtntop_mining_press_release.pdf;
Sturgis, supra note 4; Jeff Friedrich, Interview: Author and Anti-Coal Activist Jeff
Biggers Talks About the ‘Coal Roots’ of Black History Month and Will Be Speaking Friday
in Harlem, THE INDYPENDENT (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.indypendent.org/2010/02/25/jeff
-biggers-interview.
39
EFFECTS OF MOUNTAINTOP MINES, supra note 20, at 2.
40
See Banks, supra note 33, at 142–44.
41
Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 633–34.
42
See Banks, supra note 33, at 142–43.
43
Id. at 143.
44
Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 634.
45
Id. at 632–33.
46
Id. at 631–33.
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Conditions like asthma, headaches, chronic runny nose, nausea,
diarrhea, vomiting, and various skin ulcerations occur in significantly
increased rates.47 Possible long-term effects include systemic organ
failure, bone damage, and digestive tract cancers.48 Michael Hendryx, the
Associate Director of the West Virginia University Institute for Health
Policy Research, reports that the incidence of chronic disease in West
Virginia counties increases proportionally to coal production.49 Residents
of coal mining communities have a thirty percent greater chance of
reporting hypertension, are sixty-four percent more likely to develop
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and seventy percent more likely
to develop kidney disease.50 Sam Evans reports gallbladder disease and
kidney problems in ninety-eight percent of the adult population in
Prenter Hollow, as well as elevated rates of cancer, illustrated by six new
cases of brain cancer “on one 500-yard stretch of road.”51 These health
problems are additionally exacerbated by the general poverty of the
Appalachian region52 and the fact that its residents largely lack access
to adequate healthcare.53
In addition to problems resulting from regular mining operations,
human communities in the Appalachian region are frequently affected
by flooding and mining accidents.54 Flooding is more frequent and devastating following MTR operations, likely because deforestation destroys
a natural absorptive barrier to excess water, stream burial eliminates
natural drainage channels, and mine ponds are frequently constructed
inadequately, causing run-off during heavy rains.55
Inadequate construction of sedimentation ponds and sludge dams
poses its own threats to human communities in proximity to mining
sites.56 Because the material in these dams is highly toxic, leakage to

47

See id. at 633.
Id.
49
Chronic Illness Linked to Coal-Mining Pollution, Study Shows, SCIENCEDAILY (Mar.
27, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/03/080326201751.htm. For example,
data based on hospitalization records show that “COPD increases 1% for every 1,462 tons
of coal,” whereas “hypertension increases 1% for every 1,873 tons of coal.” Id.
50
Id.
51
Sam Evans, Voice from the Desecrated Places: A Journey to End Mountaintop Removal
Mining, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 528 (2010).
52
See infra Part I.C.1.
53
See Banks, supra note 33, at 148.
54
See Learn More About Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining, ILOVEMOUNTAINS.ORG,
http://ilovemountains.org/resources/#mtrcommunities (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
55
See id.; FPEIS, supra note 5, at 71–73; Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 633–34.
56
ILOVEMOUNTAINS.ORG, supra note 54.
48
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underground waterways leads to contamination of drinking water supplies.57 Breaches can have devastating effects.58 For example, in
Kentucky, in 2000, a single sludge dam breach led to the leakage of
“more than 300 million gallons of toxic coal sludge into tributaries of the
Big Sandy [River], causing what the EPA called, ‘[t]he biggest environmental disaster ever east of the Mississippi.’”59
Combined, these effects lead to a statistically significant elevation
of mortality rates in the Appalachian region as compared to the rest of
the country.60 According to a study by the Physicians for Social Responsibility, “coal ‘contributes to four of the top five causes of mortality in the
U.S. and is responsible for increasing the incidence of major diseases
already affecting large portions of the U.S. population.’ ”61 In a shocking
statistical analysis of mortality rates in Appalachian coal mining areas
for 1979–2005, Michael Hendryx and Melissa Ahern reported that “the
number of excess annual age-adjusted deaths in coal mining areas
ranged from 3,975 to 10,923, depending on years studied and comparison
group.”62 When these mortality estimates were converted to the value of
statistical life lost, the number translated to an economic loss of “$18.563
billion to $84.544 billion, with a point estimate of $50.010 billion,” far
exceeding the economic benefit of coal mining estimated at $8.088
billion.63 The authors naturally concluded, “The human cost of the
Appalachian coal mining economy outweighs its economic benefits.”64
C.

Economic Impact

1.

Appalachia’s Economy

Appalachia has been described as “one of the nation’s most desperate regions, on the brink of environmental and economic calamity.”65

57

See id.
See id.
59
Id.
60
See Michael Hendryx & Melissa M. Ahern, Mortality in Appalachian Coal Mining
Regions: The Value of Statistical Life Lost, 124 PUB. HEALTH REP. 541, 542, 547 (2009).
61
Friedrich, supra note 38.
62
Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 60, at 541.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Hannah C. Halbert, Note, From Picket Line to Courtroom: The Changing Forum for
Regional Resistance, Environmental Reform and Policy Change in Appalachia, 25
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 375, 376 (2004).
58
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Indeed, half a century after President Kennedy declared war on poverty,
Appalachia continues to be plagued by shockingly low average income,
high unemployment, low educational attainment, and a low standard of
living.66 While the Appalachian region includes parts of thirteen states
(Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and
West Virginia),67 coal mining activity is most concentrated in the intersection of Kentucky, West Virginia, and Virginia.68 The counties where
coal mining, and MTR in particular, are most prevalent are also the
counties where poverty is most rampant.69 For example, forty counties in
Kentucky and eleven counties in West Virginia have been designated
“distressed counties” for the fiscal year 2010.70 In 2006, one author
reported a probable poverty rate as high as fifty percent in Letcher
County, Kentucky.71 Eighty percent of the residents in the same county
had no access to public water utilities.72
Against the background of this devastating poverty, coal mining
has emerged as “the only sustainable industry” in the region.73 Coal
mining remains crucial to the Appalachian economy.74 A study conducted
by the Appalachian Regional Commission reported that in 1997, for

66

See Banks, supra note 33, at 125–26; The Appalachian Region, APPALACHIAN REG’L
COMM’N, http://www.arc.gov/appalachian_region/TheAppalachianRegion.asp (last visited
Apr. 4, 2011).
67
APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, supra note 66.
68
See ERIC C. THOMPSON ET AL., CTR. FOR BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF KY., A STUDY
ON THE CURRENT ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE APPALACHIAN COAL INDUSTRY AND ITS
FUTURE IN THE REGION 2 (2001), available at http://www.arc.gov/assets/research_reports/
CurrentEconomicImpactsofAppalachianCoalIndustry.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-21, SURFACE COAL MINING: CHARACTERISTICS OF MINING IN MOUNTAINOUS
AREAS OF KENTUCKY AND WEST VIRGINIA 2 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d1021.pdf (stating that “73 percent of Appalachia’s surface coal production in
2008” occurred in the mountains of Kentucky and West Virginia).
69
See Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 633.
70
ARC-Designated Distressed Counties, Fiscal Year 2010, APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N,
http://www.arc.gov/appalachian_region/ARCDesignatedDistressedCountiesFiscalYear
2010.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). Counties are designated distressed when “poverty
and unemployment rates are at least 150 percent of the national average[] and where per
capita market incomes . . . are no more than two-thirds of the national average.” Poverty
Statistics, APPALACHIAN MINISTRIES, http://www.appalachianministries.com/Poverty
-Statistics.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
71
Banks, supra note 33, at 146–47.
72
Id. at 146.
73
Id. at 127.
74
Id. at 134.
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example, coal mining earnings exceeded $50 million in five counties in
Kentucky, eight in West Virginia, and two in Virginia.75 The percentage
of coal mining gross product to total gross product was as high as fiftyfour percent in Knott County, Kentucky, seventy-two percent in Boone
County, West Virginia, and forty percent in Buchanan County, Virginia.76
“The total impact of the coal mining industry accounted . . . for 29.9% of
employment and 27.6% of earnings in the Central Appalachia region.”77
Despite these numbers, which reveal a close connection between
coal mining and employment, many authors have suggested that the
practice of MTR in particular has in fact led to the loss of thousands of
mining jobs.78 This is because MTR’s efficient utilization of machinery
has largely replaced the need for manual labor.79 What used to be accomplished by the painstaking efforts of miners working for hours in a
traditional underground mine, is now achieved by several tons of explosives and the push of a button.80 Coal production from surface mines,
measured in tons per miner per hour, is approximately three times
higher than that from underground mines.81 As a result, while coal
production is rising, mining employment is on the decline.82
2.

Pressure for Coal from the Outside

Coal is arguably the most important energy resource in the
United States.83 It directly contributes to the production of approximately
half the electricity generated in the United States.84 With increasingly
intensifying conflicts in the Middle East and a growing desire to reduce
America’s dependence on foreign oil, the importance of coal production
is only projected to increase.85
75

THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 68, at 2.
Id.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 633; Halbert, supra note 65, at 386;
McGinley, supra note 6, at 21.
79
Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 633.
80
See Halbert, supra note 65, at 386.
81
Most Requested Statistics—U.S. Coal Industry, NAT’L MINING ASS’N, http://www.nma
.org/pdf/c_most_requested.pdf (last updated Nov. 2010).
82
HUMPHRIES, supra note 6, at 15. For example, productivity, measured in tons per workerhour rose by about twenty-one percent from 1996 to 2000, while at the same time the
number of coal miners fell from 83,462 to 70,000. Id.
83
See, e.g., Reid Mullen, Note, Statutory Complexity Disguises Agency Capture in Citizens
Coal Council v. EPA, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 927, 932 (2007).
84
Id.
85
Id.
76
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Although Appalachia is far from being the only geographical area
in the United States where coal is extracted, bituminous and anthracite
coal, the two types of coal that are most useful for electricity generation
due to higher energy content and heating values, are found primarily in
Appalachia.86 Kentucky and West Virginia are particularly famous for
relatively clean-burning coal with a low sulfur level.87 This is one of the
reasons why Appalachia has been dubbed “the ‘Saudi Arabia of coal.’ ”88
As of 2008, more than one-third of U.S. coal came from Appalachia.89
Currently, only about a third of U.S. coal is obtained from traditional underground mines.90 The remaining two-thirds come from various
methods of surface mining, which are both cheaper and more efficient,
albeit more detrimental to the environment.91 However, “[a]ccording to the
EPA, mountaintop removal accounted for less than 5% of US coal production as of 2001.”92 This number of course varies significantly by state.93
In West Virginia, for example, 2006 estimates indicate that approximately thirty percent of coal in the state is obtained through MTR.94
II.

EFFORTS TO AMELIORATE THE PROBLEM

A.

Laws and Regulations

Although most of the Appalachian states have distinct state
departments charged with regulation of mining activities,95 state mining
laws and policies are functionally guided by federally imposed mandatory minimum regulatory requirements.96 This note, therefore, focuses

86

See HUMPHRIES, supra note 6, at 4–5.
Id. at 25.
88
See McGinley, supra note 6, at 24.
89
Allison Subacz, Note, Mountaintop Removal: Case Studies and Legislative Update of
the Permitting Process, 4 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 49, 50 & n.8 (2010) (quoting
the Energy Information Administration).
90
HUMPHRIES, supra note 6, at 3.
91
See id. at 3, 25; see also NAT’L MINING ASS’N, supra note 81 (listing production numbers
in short tons from 2002–2009).
92
ILOVEMOUNTAINS.ORG, supra note 54.
93
See id.
94
Evans, supra note 51, at 571.
95
See, e.g., VA. DEP’T OF MINES, MINERALS & ENERGY, http://www.dmme.virginia.gov/
(last visited Apr. 4, 2011); Division of Mining and Reclamation, W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL.
PROT., http://www.dep.wv.gov/dmr/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
96
See Gamble, supra note 9, at 423.
87
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exclusively on the federal laws and regulations that establish the legislative framework of MTR.
Four federal statutes play a significant role in regulating and
enforcing standards for MTR mining and reclamation operations: the
SMCRA,97 the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),98 the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”),99 and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).100
SMCRA and CWA provide substantive standards for regulating surface
mining,101 whereas NEPA and APA are procedural statutes that guide
enforcement of the substantive laws.102 Relevant aspects of these statutes are discussed below.
1.

SMCRA

Regulating coal mining presents an interesting dilemma. On one
hand, historically, regulation was left exclusively to the states, in recognition of the fact that each state had unique goals and concerns when it
came to mining.103 On another, the states were ultimately in competition
with each other for coal production in one global market reality.104 Recognizing that increased regulation inevitably imposes additional costs and
decreases profit margins, no one state had an incentive to adopt safety
regulations for fear that the rest would not follow suit.105 Congress’s
answer to this dilemma was a “cooperative federalism” statute, one that
essentially left regulation in the hands of the states but imposed federal
minimum standards.106 Thus, in 1977, Congress passed the SMCRA.107
The SMCRA is the only federal law that is specifically enacted to
address problems and concerns arising from surface mining practices.108
The law provides for the set up of the federal Office of Surface Mining

97

Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2006).
Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
99
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006).
100
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2006) (explicating judicial review
under the Act).
101
See Gamble, supra note 9, at 422–23.
102
See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 191–92 (4th Cir. 2009)
(discussing NEPA and APA as procedural statutes in the opinion).
103
See Gamble, supra note 9, at 423–24.
104
See id. at 423.
105
See id.
106
Id. at 424.
107
See Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2006).
108
See Gamble, supra note 9, at 423–24.
98
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(“OSM”); “[g]ives enforcement power to the states” conditioned on prior
approval of their SMCRA programs by OSM, which in turn requires the
adoption of certain minimum requirements; mandates coal companies to
get mining permits and reclamation bonds; and “[a]llows for citizen
intervention in permit and enforcement decisions.”109 Specific provisions
of the SMCRA regulate disposal of excess spoil material from surface
mining operations, construction of valley fills, and subsequent reclamation of the mined land.110
Reclamation requirements under the SMCRA mandate that upon
completion of mining operations the disturbed land be restored to its
“approximate original contour” (“AOC”) and returned to its prior condition, or to a condition that supports “higher and better uses.”111 This
requirement in essence prohibits surface mining in areas where subsequent “reclamation is not possible.”112 However, in order to stimulate
economic development, the SMCRA allows a coal operator to request an
AOC requirement waiver based on proposing “commercial, industrial,
residential, agricultural, and/or public uses” for the land following
completion of mining operations.113
Another particularly important regulation of the SMCRA, known
as the “buffer” zone rule,114 provides that “[n]o land within one hundred
feet . . . of an intermittent or perennial stream shall be disturbed by
surface mining operations including roads unless specifically authorized
by the Secretary.”115 Such authorization in turn requires a finding that
“surface mining activities will not adversely affect the water quantity
and quality or other environmental resources of the stream and will not
cause or contribute to violations of applicable state or federal water
quality standards.”116
109

See SMCRA Overview, KENTUCKIANS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH, http://www.kftc.org/
our-work/canary-project/resources/fight-back/smcra (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
110
See 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (2006).
111
30 U.S.C. § 1265(b); Gamble, supra note 9, at 401; KENTUCKIANS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH,
supra note 109.
112
KENTUCKIANS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH, supra note 109.
113
30 U.S.C. § 1265(c); McGinley, supra note 6, at 64–65.
114
30 C.F.R. § 816.57 (2010) (imparting federal requirement that to comply with the SMCRA,
the permittee or operator must not conduct surface mining activities within one hundred
feet of a stream); see Gamble, supra note 9, at 403 (noting that the buffer zone regulation
was promulgated by the Department of the Interior).
115
Gamble, supra note 9, at 403 (citing W. VA. CODE R. § 38-2-5.2). West Virginia’s
regulations are very similar to 30 C.F.R. § 816.57 and worded more succinctly. Compare
30 C.F.R. § 816.57, with Gamble, supra note 9, at 403.
116
Gamble, supra note 9, at 403 (citing W. VA. CODE R. § 38-2-5.2).
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CWA

In addition to obtaining SMCRA permits, coal companies are
required to obtain permits certifying their projects’ compliance with the
CWA.117 The purpose of the CWA is to “ ‘restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters’ by eliminating
‘the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters.’ ”118 Surface mining
operations necessarily implicate the CWA because valley fills frequently
cause pollution and permanent destruction of entire streams.119
Two types of CWA permits are particularly relevant to surface
mining in general and MTR in particular. First, pursuant to section 402,
a coal company must obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”) permit, issued by the EPA, in order to be able to
discharge potential pollutants from a point source within the mining
operation into navigable waters.120 This situation occurs, for example,
when treated water from a sediment pond is released back to a stream.121
The second type of permit, pursuant to section 404, is required when a
mining project involves disposal of excess spoil into navigable waters or,
in other words, for the construction of a valley fill.122 Section 404 permits
are issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) upon an evaluation process that requires the balancing of benefits “reasonably . . .
expected to accrue from the proposal . . . against its reasonably foreseeable detriments.”123
The Corps can issue either individual permits, restricted to a
particular mining site, or general nationwide permits, the most common
of which is known as Nationwide Permit 21 (“NWP 21”).124 Unlike individual permits, which require comprehensive case-by-case evaluations

117

Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 190 (4th Cir. 2009).
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 190 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).
119
See supra Part I.B.2.
120
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 190 (describing the permit processes surface
mine operators must undertake to meet with CWA compliance).
121
Id.
122
See id. at 190–91.
123
Id. at 191 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2008)); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2010).
124
See Orit Zeevi, Recent Developments, Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Bulen:
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Rules that Nationwide Permit 21 Issued
by the Army Corps of Engineers Complies with the Clean Water Act, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL.
L. 251, 252 (2006) (describing Nationwide Permit 21 as a general permit that authorizes
discharges of fill material associated with surface mining and reclamation efforts
into waterways).
118
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and can only be issued after notice and opportunity for a public hearing,
general permits circumvent much of the evaluation process and authorize certain categories of activities with little, if any, regulatory involvement by the Corps.125 Issuance of general permits is conditioned upon the
Corps finding that a category of activities involving dredged or fill material
“are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental
effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”126 The Corps’s determination of
what constitutes minimal adverse environmental effects is a highly
controversial issue that has recently become subject to heated litigation.127
3.

NEPA

The NEPA requires federal agencies to evaluate and account for
“the potential environmental consequences of their actions.”128 This includes preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for actions
“significantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . . .”129
Determining “significance” of environmental effects in this context may
additionally require the preparation of an Environmental Assessment
(“EA”).130 The purpose of an EA is to “provide sufficient evidence and
analysis for determining whether to prepare an [EIS] or a finding of no
significant impact [(“FONSI”)].”131
4.

APA

The APA comes into play in MTR regulation because it authorizes
judicial review of federal agency action, such as action pursuant to the
CWA and the NEPA, under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard.132
125

See Julia Fuschino, Note, Mountaintop Coal Mining and the Clean Water Act: The
Fight over Nationwide Permit 21, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 179, 189–90 (2007)
(describing the difference between an individual and a general permit).
126
Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2006).
127
See discussion infra Part II.C.
128
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 191 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)).
129
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); see also
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 191 (discussing the EIS requirement of NEPA).
130
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 191 (discussing how significance is determined
under NEPA).
131
Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1) (2010), which regulates how EAs are conducted
under NEPA).
132
5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2006); see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 192.
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Pursuant to section 10 of the APA, a court may set aside agency actions,
findings, and conclusions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”133 Although this
standard is high and exceedingly deferential, with a presumption of
validity of administrative agency action, it nonetheless provides an
avenue for judicial recourse in cases of agency failure.134 The statute thus
becomes particularly important in the context of agency capture.135
B.

Law Enforcement

Given this rather sizable amount of laws and regulations, one
might wonder how and why we continue to lose tens of mountaintops136
and hundreds of miles of waterways every year.137 The answer lies not so
much in the lack of comprehensive laws and regulations as much as in
the lack of stringent enforcement,138 facilitated by a history of political
games and agency capture.139 In the words of Jim Hecker, a prominent
environmental lawyer and defender of Appalachia,140 “[t]here is a consistent pattern that government regulators and enforcers let large numbers
of serious violations go unpunished and uncorrected.”141
The lack of adequate law enforcement has been particularly
visible with respect to the SMCRA.142 Since its very inception back in
1977, the SMCRA has faced significant opposition by the coal industry,
including several constitutional challenges.143 Instead of standing their
federally mandated ground in this dispute, state political and regulatory
entities, including the very agencies responsible for administration and
enforcement of the law, gave in to King Coal.144 In West Virginia, for
133

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006), cited in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 413 n.30 (1971); see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 192.
134
See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 192.
135
See infra Part II.D.1.
136
See McGinley, supra note 6, at 55 n.176.
137
See id.
138
See Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 648.
139
See infra Part II.D.1.
140
For background information on Jim Hecker, see generally Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3,
at 637–38. Hecker’s environmental litigation efforts are discussed throughout the Comment.
141
Id. at 648.
142
See Banks, supra note 33, at 165; McGinley, supra note 6, at 54, 64–72, 76; see also
Evans, supra note 51, at 558 (“Although SMCRA’s requirements are stringent on paper,
they are poorly enforced.”).
143
See McGinley, supra note 6, at 53.
144
See id. at 64–70.
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example, the state Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”)
routinely failed to enforce the AOC requirements of the SMCRA.145 Over
a period of two decades, the DEP granted hundreds of mining permits
despite the fact that mining applications failed to include the necessary
AOC waivers and proposals for adequate post-mining land reclamation.146 One estimate, based on a Freedom of Information request and
review of mining permits, showed that in 1997, “75% of active mountaintop removal mines in West Virginia were being operated in violation of
state and federal law.”147 Consequently, entire mountains tumbled down
with devastating consequences for the environment, while the economic
development148 that was supposed to invigorate the region and bring new
jobs where they were so desperately needed never happened.149
It would be a mistake to place the blame for this lawlessness
solely at the hands of the state regulatory authorities. The very purpose
behind adopting a “cooperative federalism”150 approach in the SMCRA
and creating the OSM was to ensure federal oversight of the process.151 It
is strictly the OSM’s obligation to ensure that the federally required standards are being followed and, upon a showing to the contrary, to assume
exclusive federal jurisdiction over all state mining operations.152 Instead
of following the law, the OSM simply chose to ignore the situation.153
Lack of law enforcement is by no means exclusive to the SMCRA
but extends to all statutes relevant to MTR regulation, including the
CWA and the NEPA.154 This became particularly obvious in Bragg v.
Robertson, a suit in which the plaintiffs alleged that the Corps routinely
violated aspects of the SMCRA, CWA, and NEPA by granting mining

145

See id. at 64–69.
See id. at 66–68.
147
Id. at 66–67.
148
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing AOC waivers for promotion of economic development
of mined regions).
149
See McGinley, supra note 6, at 67, 70–71.
150
Id. at 51.
151
See id. at 51–52.
152
Id.
153
See id. at 68.
154
See Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 641; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APRIL
1, 2010 MEMORANDUM QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 3 (2010), available at http://water.epa.gov/
lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2010_04_02_wetlands_guidance_appalachian_mtntop
_mining_qa.pdf (“EPA’s Permit Quality Review demonstrated that Appalachian States
are not giving appropriate effect to their own narrative standards in the permitting
process as required by the Clean Water Act.”).
146
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permits without making the requisite prior environmental impact assessments.155 A deposition in the case revealed that one permit reviewer
“assessed and approved 8,000 mining permits without conducting the
required investigation.”156
Law enforcement today is almost as grim as it was in the 1990s,
although with a recent trend of improvement.157 In June 2009, recognizing the gravity of the problem, the Obama administration implemented
an Interagency Action Plan aimed at reducing the environmental impacts of MTR in Appalachia.158 One of the objectives was to “[e]nsure
coordinated and stringent environmental reviews of permit applications
under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1997 (SMCRA).”159 This resulted in an “Enhanced
Coordination Procedure” (“ECP”) review of seventy-nine pending permit
applications for surface coal mining projects in six Appalachian states.160
In September 2009, upon completion of its initial review, the EPA announced that each and every single one of the seventy-nine applications
raised potential environmental concerns and required further review.161
Specifically, the EPA found that none of the applications contained
sufficient information on reclamation and mitigation plans, the majority
of applications failed to demonstrate avoidance and minimization of
environmental impacts in accordance with the law, and over eighty
percent of the applications exhibited a “potential for excursions from
applicable state or Federal water quality standards . . . .”162 As of March
24, 2011, the EPA website indicated that out of the original seventy-nine
permit applications planned for ECP, forty-four were voluntarily withdrawn

155

See Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 642 (S.D. W.Va. 1999); Baller & Pantilat,
supra note 3, at 641; infra Part II.C.1.
156
Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3, at 641 & n.115 (referencing the deposition of a permit
reviewer in an earlier proceeding of the Bragg case).
157
See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Obama Administration Takes Unprecedented
Steps to Reduce Environmental Impacts of Mountaintop Coal Mining, Announces Interagency
Action Plan to Implement Reforms (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/pdf/MTM_Release_6-11-09.pdf.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SURFACE COAL MINING ACTIVITIES ENHANCED COORDINATION
PROCEDURES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE FINAL LIST 1, 3 (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/ECP_Q&A_09-30-09_final.pdf.
161
Letter from Peter S. Silva, EPA Assistant Adm’r, to Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Sec’y
of the Army, Civil Works (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://water.epa.gov/ lawsregs/
guidance/wetlands/upload/wetlands_pdf_EPA_Letter_to_Army_Final_ECP_09 -30-09.pdf.
162
Id.
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by the applicants, twenty-five were awaiting start of ECP review due to
pending additional information from the applicants, two were under
review, and only eight permits were issued.163
In April 2010, under the leadership of the Obama administration,
the EPA released two new scientific draft reports on MTR and took
further steps to improve law compliance by issuing a comprehensive
draft guidance, effective immediately, intended “to . . . clarify and
strengthen environmental permitting requirements for Appalachian
mountaintop removal . . . .”164 Without altering the legal regulatory
framework per se,165 the EPA elaborated on its expectations with regard
to permitting requirements and related activities under the CWA, the
NEPA, and the Environmental Justice Order.166 Motivated by new
scientific evidence167 and a recent Permit Quality Review conducted in
West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio, during which “it became
clear that many of the state-issued NPDES permits failed to comply with
the requirements of the CWA in several respects,”168 the EPA endorsed,
among other measures, a particular range of instream conductivity levels

163

See Surface Coal Mining Activities Enhanced Coordination Procedures—Project List,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/mining
-projects.cfm (last updated Mar. 10, 2011).
164
Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Issues Comprehensive Guidance to
Protect Appalachian Communities from Harmful Environmental Impacts of Mountain
Top Mining, (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/
upload/2010_04_10_wetlands_guidance_appalachian_mtntop_mining_press_release.pdf;
see also Guidance on Improving EPA Review of Appalachian Surface Coal Mining
Operations, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,500 (Apr. 12, 2010); Memorandum from Peter S. Silva,
Assistant Adm’r for Water, and Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r for Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, to Shawn Garvin, Reg’l Adm’r, A. Stanley Meiburg, Acting Reg’l
Adm’r, and Bharat Mathur, Acting Reg’l Adm’r, Detailed Guidance: Improving EPA
Review of Appalachian Surface Coal Mining Operations Under the Clean Water Act,
National Environmental Policy Act, and the Environmental Justice Executive Order
(Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/
2010_04_01_wetlands_guidance_appalachian_mtntop_mining_detailed.pdf [hereinafter
EPA Guidance Summary] (memorandum to clarify expectations and responsibilities to
improve compliance).
165
The EPA was quick to note its guidance memoranda “do not represent a regulation,
and are not subject to the formal provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.”
Guidance on Improving EPA Review of Appalachian Surface Coal Mining Operations, 75
Fed. Reg. 18,500 (Apr. 12, 2010).
166
See EPA Guidance Summary, supra note 164, at 1–6.
167
See, e.g., EFFECTS OF MOUNTAINTOP MINES, supra note 20; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, A FIELD-BASED AQUATIC LIFE BENCHMARK FOR CONDUCTIVITY IN CENTRAL
APPALACHIAN STREAMS (2010) (external review draft).
168
EPA Guidance Summary, supra note 164, at 2.
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to serve as a benchmark in protecting aquatic life and preserving the
biological integrity of Appalachian waters.169
In January 2011, exercising its veto power under section 404(c)
of the CWA, the EPA vetoed the MTR permit for Arch Coal’s Spruce No.
1, a mine in Logan County, West Virginia, that was projected to disturb
approximately 3.5 square miles and bury approximately 7.5 miles of
streams170 and which would have been “the largest in Appalachia.”171
Citing “significant degradation of downstream aquatic ecosystems[,] . . .
unacceptable adverse effects on wildlife,” and failure of Arch Coal to take
corrective action, the EPA concluded that “these adverse impacts do not
comply with the requirements of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and EPA’s
implementing regulations . . . .”172
Although the initiation of these recent steps, including the implementation of the interagency action plan, the issuance of the EPA’s new
guidance, and the veto of the permit for Spruce No. 1, offer a glimmer of
hope for improved law enforcement in the future, it also paints a shocking and sad picture of the current state of affairs. Lack of adequate MTR
permit review, mining operations in clear violation of federal law, lack
of coordination between different regulatory authorities, and devastating
consequences for the environment are the hallmarks of this picture.
Given the magnitude of the problems, it is unclear whether the EPA,
even with its recently acquired willingness for change, will be able, on its
own and without major regulatory overhauls, to turn the picture around.
C.

Judicial (In)action

In the past several years, environmental organizations like the
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition (“OVEC”), Coal River Mountain
Watch, and Kentuckians For The Commonwealth (“Kentuckians”) have
initiated heated litigation in federal courts in an attempt to mandate
more stringent law enforcement and to mitigate the environmental impact
of MTR.173 Four cases, each of which enjoyed some success at the district
169

See id. at 2–3.
Final Determination of the Assistant Administrator for Water Pursuant to Section
404(c) of the Clean Water Act Concerning the Spruce No. 1 Mine, Logan County, WV, 76
Fed. Reg. 3126, 3126–27 (Jan. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Final Determination].
171
Erica Peterson, EPA Spruce Mine Veto Criticized by Politicians, Cheered by
Environmentalists, W. VA. PUB. BROADCASTING (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.wvpubcast
.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=18394.
172
Final Determination, 76 Fed. Reg. 3126, 3127–28 (Jan. 19, 2011).
173
See generally Baller & Pantilat, supra note 3 (describing the key players driving MTR
litigation, their goals, and their legal strategies).
170
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court level, only to be later overturned by a conservative Fourth Circuit,
are particularly illustrative of the issues in dispute and of the courts’
general reluctance to endorse the environmental cause and to require
stricter enforcement of the federal laws.174 These are described below.
1.

Bragg v. Robertson

In Bragg v. Robertson, the plaintiffs alleged that the West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”) violated relevant
provisions of the SMCRA, the CWA, and the NEPA by various actions,
including issuing mining permits without making the necessary findings
required for granting variances under the AOC and buffer zone rules.175
The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued an injunction
to prevent issuance of the permits, but, on appeal, the Fourth Circuit
reversed. Instead of deciding the case on the merits and engaging in a
substantive review of the alleged violations, the appellate court disposed
of the case by holding that “a federal judge did not have the authority to
issue an injunction against state officials.”176
2.

Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh

In Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, the
plaintiffs challenged the issuance of general section 404 CWA permits
for MTR by alleging that valley fills, resulting from MTR, did not fulfill
the definition of “fill material” under section 404 but were better classified as waste.177 While litigation was ongoing, the Bush administration
changed the definition of “fill material” under the CWA so that it specifically included “overburden from mining or other excavation activities.”178 Nonetheless, the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs
174

Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D. W.
Va. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th
Cir. 2009); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D. W. Va. 2004),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005); Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), vacated, 317
F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003); Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), rev’d
sub nom. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).
175
Bragg, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 660–61; see Gamble, supra note 9, at 406–07; Baller &
Pantilat, supra note 3, at 641.
176
Clark, supra note 10, at 144.
177
Kentuckians, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 930; Clark, supra note 10, at 144–45; see also supra
Part II.A.2.
178
Clark, supra note 10, at 145.
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and declared the change of the definition “ultra vires” and beyond the
scope of authority granted to the administration.179 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit once again reversed, holding that “the district court’s
invalidation of the Bush Administration’s new rules was beyond the
scope of the issue.”180
3.

OVEC v. Bulen

In OVEC v. Bulen, the issuance of general permits under section
404 of the CWA was challenged again.181 Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that issuing NWP 21 for valley fills was inconsistent with the
legislative history and the plain language of the CWA182 because valley
fills by definition exceed the “minimal adverse environmental effects”
required for issuance of NWP 21.183 Once again the district court found
in favor of the plaintiffs, and once again the Fourth Circuit reversed,
holding that the environmental impact review required for issuance of a
NWP 21 was sufficient.184
4.

OVEC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Most recently, in OVEC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
plaintiffs again challenged the issuance of general section 404 CWA
permits for MTR valley fills, this time alleging that the Corps violated its
duties by failing to conduct an adequate environmental impact assessment prior to issuing a FONSI185 and granting four general mining
permits.186 OVEC further sought judicial review of the agency’s actions
under the APA.187 The district court again sided with the plaintiffs,
179

Kentuckians, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 943, 946–47; Clark, supra note 10, at 145.
Clark, supra note 10, at 145.
181
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453 (S.D. W. Va. 2004), aff’d
in part, vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005).
182
Id.; see also supra Part II.A.2.
183
Fuschino, supra note 125, at 180; see Clark, supra note 10, at 145. Fuschino also
provides a detailed description of the debate over NWP 21, including a review of the
legislative history and intent. See Fuschino, supra note 125, at 189–206.
184
Clark, supra note 10, at 145.
185
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607, 607 (S.D.
W. Va. 2007); see supra Part II.A.3 (discussing that the purpose of an environmental
assessment is to determine whether to prepare an EIS or issue a FONSI).
186
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 479 F. Supp. 2d, at 616; see Clark, supra note 10, at 145–46.
187
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 479 F. Supp. 2d, at 616; see Clark, supra note 10, at 146;
supra Part II.A.4 (discussing the APA).
180

2011]

LET’S FACE FACTS, THESE MOUNTAINS WON’T GROW BACK 953

finding that the Corps failed to meet the standards of both the CWA and
the NEPA and acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to its own
regulations in failing to conduct an adequate environmental assessment.188 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the Corps was not
required to consider environmental impacts of the entire valley fill or
undertake a functional assessment of its effects, and therefore did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in conducting its limited environmental review.189
5.

Conclusion

The picture that emerges from the cases summarized above is one
of overall judicial inaction. Courts, the Fourth Circuit in particular,
appear to be hesitant in assuming a more active role in determining the
fate of future MTR policy and practice.190 Skepticism and general mistrust of environmental citizen actions, as well as unwillingness to step
on the toes of policy-making institutions, such as federal agencies or
state authorities, have been the hallmarks of much MTR litigation.191 It
is unlikely that this trend will change in the future, especially without
encouragement and clear guidance from the legislative and executive
branches of government.
D.

Politics and Agency Capture by the Coal Mining Industry

Given the magnitude of environmental destruction192 caused by
MTR and the relatively marginal economic benefit193 provided by the
practice, one might wonder what drives the continued lack of law enforcement194 and judicial inaction.195 As with most issues of global economic and environmental significance, the answer lies in politics and
agency capture, both of which play a significant role in determining the
direction of MTR policy. This section aims to expose the suspiciously
close relationship between the coal industry and key players in MTR
188
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regulation as well as to illustrate the impact of differing political agendas, represented by changing administrations, on global MTR policy.
1.

Agency Capture196

In a hardly surprising response to increased echoes of environmental concern, the coal industry has been pouring millions of dollars to
promulgate coal-friendly policies.197 According to a report by Sue
O’Connell of the Institute on Money in State Politics, the coal mining
industry “contributed at least $8.57 million to state-level political candidates and party committees” between 1999 and 2005.198 Similarly, Julie
Archer, a research analyst for the West Virginia People’s Election Reform
Coalition, reported that coal operators and industry leaders donated over
“$2 million to gubernatorial campaigns, $1.5 million to state legislative
races, and $529,332 to Supreme Court candidates” in West Virginia
during the election cycles of 1996–2004.199 This trend continued in 2006
and 2008, with total coal money contributions of over $500,000 during
each election cycle.200 In gubernatorial races, such donations accounted
for up to twenty-six percent of total campaign contributions.201
The inevitable result is that “running a political campaign against
the coal industry in the Appalachian region is an election failure guarantee.”202 As one author observed, “the democratic political process favors
the well-organized and well-funded mining industry at the expense of the

196

I am using the term “agency capture” broadly rather than literally. While this term
usually implies the industry’s control over a regulating administrative agency, see Clark,
supra note 10, at 148, in this instance I am using it to imply control over the entire
policy-making and enforcement process. This includes “capture” of not just the
administrative agencies involved, but also of the political, legislative, and judicial bodies
that collaborate in establishing and implementing MTR policy.
197
See Paul J. Nyden, Coal Has Given Millions to Candidates, Report Says, CHARLESTON
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198
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200606011.pdf.
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ordinary citizen’s interest rather than equally weighing the costs and
benefits to all.”203
The situation is no different at the federal level. According to the
Center for Responsive Politics, coal companies donated $9 million to
federal political candidates between 1998 and 2004.204 Approximately
ninety percent of these donations went to Republican candidates.205 In
the 2000 presidential election alone, the Bush campaign received close
to $4 million in coal industry money.206 Under these circumstances, it
comes as no surprise that the Bush administration embraced a variety
of measures geared towards facilitating MTR.207 In the words of Jim
Hecker, “it is impossible even to commence discussion with the Bush
administration because it is ‘like negotiating with the coal industry.’ ”208
When a regulatory body is captured or controlled by industry, the
judiciary becomes a particularly important player in the effort to combat
such capture and ensure independent and statutorily compliant decisionmaking.209 Unfortunately, in the case of MTR, this critical role of the
judiciary is undermined by pervasive ties between the coal industry and
members of the judiciary itself.210 The industry routinely pours money
into state Supreme Courts.211 Because state judges are elected, they tend
to be “more . . . partial and sympathetic to the coal mining industry.”212
This is one of the reasons why key MTR advocates, like Joe Lovett and
Jim Hecker, choose to litigate exclusively in federal court.213
However, problems exist on the federal level as well. Hecker and
Lovett believe federal judges are frequently influenced by politics.214 A study
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conducted by the Environmental Law Institute in 2004 showed that on
the appellate level, Republican appointees were six times more likely to
decide cases against environmental plaintiffs than Democratic appointees.215 Ties between the coal industry and the judiciary are also reflected
in the high rates of judicial recusal in high-profile MTR cases.216 In the
Fourth Circuit alone, five of fourteen judges “have repeatedly recused
themselves” because of “conflicts of interest with the coal industry.”217
The ties between the coal industry and virtually every branch of
the state and federal government are pervasive and disturbing.218 It is
not the purpose of this note to explore the legality or illegality of these
connections or the respective financial contributions, but merely to point
out the overwhelming evidence that the coal industry plays an impermissible part in deciding the future of MTR. This is a clear recipe for disaster in a field that should be governed by public policy rather than by
private financial stake and where a huge potential for conflict between
public policy and private financial stake exists.
2.

Politics

MTR policy, regulation, and law enforcement are highly dependent on the political agenda of the administration in charge. This section
illustrates this relationship by comparing the state of affairs under the
Bush and Obama administrations.
The general trend of the Bush administration was to pave the way
for increased mining activity and to remove as many of the roadblocks
established by existing laws as possible.219 Joe Lovett,220 a prominent
environmental lawyer and executive director of the Appalachian Center
for the Economy and the Environment in Lewisburg, West Virginia,
characterized the Bush administration’s policies as “a complete collapse
of any effort to effectively regulate the coal mining industry and apply
the laws that are on the books.”221
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In 2002, for example, in the midst of one of the most important
judicial decisions on MTR, Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v.
Rivenburgh,222 the Bush administration changed the definition of “fill
material” under the CWA to include specifically “overburden from mining,”
in effect deciding the case in favor of allowing dumping of mining waste in
streams.223 Despite Judge Haden’s objection that such a change was “contrary to the spirit and letter of the Clean Water Act” the Bush administration, aided by a conservative Fourth Circuit, ultimately prevailed.224
Even more devastating was Bush’s mark on the SMCRA and the
buffer zone rule.225 In 2004, the OSM drafted a proposal to amend
SMCRA regulations in a way that would eliminate the requirement for
extensive regulatory review prior to granting permits for mining operations within one hundred feet of intermittent or perennial streams226 and
replace it with a requirement that mining operators use, “to the extent
possible . . . the best technology currently available” to avoid environmental damage to the area.227 The amendment “would effectively gut the
buffer zone rule.”228 Environmentalists objected immediately, pointing
out, among other criticisms, that the OSM failed to conduct an environmental impact assessment of the proposed new rule.229 They succeeded
in slowing down the process and forcing the OSM to conduct an EIS, but
the rule ultimately passed anyway in 2008 as Bush’s parting gift to the
coal industry.230
Shortly after President Obama took office, the MTR policy pendulum
started swinging in the opposite direction.231 In June 2009, recognizing
222
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the gravity of the problem, the Obama administration implemented an
interagency action plan aimed at reducing the environmental impacts of
MTR in Appalachia.232 Among the first changes that resulted from this
action plan was a proposal for repeal of the buffer zone rule adopted by
the Bush administration and a return to the 1983 version of the rule.233
Although changes in rules and regulations can always be expected with
changing administrations and are certainly understandable in light of
global partisan policy differences, the effect of politics on rule-making
presents a significant obstacle in the path of adopting a stable and
consistent policy with regard to MTR.
III.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

The goal of this section is to introduce and evaluate some of the
changes that can be implemented to ameliorate the negative impacts of
MTR on the environment and on human communities. The proposals
discussed here attempt to address the problem from a multitude of
sometimes overlapping institutional perspectives—legislative, judicial,
administrative, industry-specific, environmental, social, and scientific.
These perspectives are neither mutually exclusive nor completely compatible and harmonious with each other. They are necessarily
constrained by the inherently differing interests of different institutions.
There is no solution to MTR that will leave everyone happy. Nor is there
a solution, short of banning MTR altogether, that will completely solve
the problems with MTR by eliminating any and all devastating effects of
the practice on the environment and on human communities. However,
if implementation of even one of the measures discussed here results in
alleviation of some aspect of the MTR problem, then it is a step in the
right direction and one desperately worth making.
A.

Amending Laws and Regulations

Tightening the existing legal and regulatory framework of MTR
is the first step to ameliorating some of the negative impacts of MTR on the
environment and on human communities. Some action in this direction
has already been suggested by the Obama Administration.234 Specific
proposals for amending the SMCRA and the CWA are discussed below.
232
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One of the main purposes of the SMCRA is to “strike a balance
between protection of the environment and agricultural productivity and
the Nation’s need for coal as an essential source of energy.”235 This delicate
balance took a serious hit when the OSM adopted a rule that effectively
replaced the buffer zone rule236 with a requirement for using the best
technology currently available to prevent environmental damage when
dumping overburden within 100 feet of intermittent or perennial streams.237
The most immediate change to the SMCRA rules and regulations
that should be implemented is, at a minimum, a return to the 1983
version of the buffer zone rule238 and stringent regulation of mining
operations within 100 feet of the headwater streams that essentially
sustain the entire aquatic system of Appalachia.239 This change is currently being contemplated in a notice of proposed rule-making issued by
the OSM in late 2009.240 The agency is also considering further strengthening regulation by: “apply[ing] the prohibitions and restrictions of the
buffer zone rule to all segments of all perennial and intermittent streams
and to the surface of all lands within 100 feet of those streams”; establishing a “rebuttable presumption that the placement of excess spoil or
coal mine waste in an intermittent or perennial stream is prohibited
because it would result in an unacceptable level of environmental damage”; or prohibiting “placement of excess spoil or coal mine waste in
perennial and intermittent streams . . .” altogether while restricting such
deposits in ephemeral streams.241 Each of these proposals has tremendous potential for alleviating some of the devastating effects of MTR on
the environment, and particularly on Appalachia’s waterways.
Another important change to the SMCRA involves the adoption
of more precise quantitative definitions to many of the terms used in the
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statute and the respective rules and regulations.242 The current version
of the statute is focused primarily on objectives, such as minimizing
environmental damage, at the expense of providing concrete quantitative
means for achieving these objectives.243 This lack of emphasis on concrete
means in turn provides wiggle room for violations and complicates law
enforcement.244 Although OSM is rightly considering changes to the rules
in favor of quantitative requirements,245 it might make more sense to
ultimately adopt some of these changes at the legislative level, however
long and complicated the process, in order to circumvent the inherent
instability of administrative agency action resulting from agency capture
and political influence by changing administrations.246
2.

CWA

Perhaps the single most important amendment of the CWA that
should be undertaken to ameliorate the negative impacts of MTR is the
elimination of general permits under section 404 of the CWA available
to MTR coal mining operators for discharging dredge and fill into mountain valleys.247 Such general permitting, which circumvents at once the
process of notice and opportunity for a hearing and a detailed case-bycase assessment of the impact of a potential mining site on the surrounding aquatic environment,248 is expressly conditioned on a finding of
minimal adverse environmental impact of an operation, both individually
and cumulatively.249 As I hope this note has demonstrated, there is
nothing minimal about the environmental impact of MTR. It takes but
a single look at a picture of a fish with two eyes on one side and an
abnormal spine curvature to realize this.250
The fight over section 404 general permits for MTR, and NWP 21
permits in particular, has already begun, albeit without successful
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resolution to date.251 While analyzing MTR litigation under the CWA in
federal courts, Julia Fuschino suggested various arguments for challenging the issuance of NWP 21 to MTR coal mining operators.252 Although
she correctly observed that the adequacy of the minimum-impact determinations by the Corps should be contested,253 her argument that by
“requiring . . . [such determinations] before a project commences, the
chance of significant environmental harm occurring can be minimized,
if not eliminated”254 is naïve and misplaced. It implicitly endorses the
erroneous view that there are circumstances in which the issuance of a
general permit for a valley fill would be acceptable and thus ignores the
amount of scientific data available to support the fact that a finding of
minimal impact in the context of valley fills is never possible. Given the
weight of the scientific evidence,255 restricting the approval of MTR
mining operations through granting of only individual permits under
section 404 and requiring a thorough case-by-case assessment of environmental harm in each project, or alternatively disposing with section 404
permits in general, are the only ways to implement the legislative intent
behind the CWA and preserve the nation’s waterways from the devastating effects of MTR.
B.

Strengthening Law Enforcement

As previously discussed, lack of stringent law enforcement is one
of the leading contributing factors to the continued environmental degradation caused by MTR.256 Although this problem is easy to acknowledge,
251
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knowing how to fix it, short of hoping that the government will just start
doing a better job, presents significant challenges.
Perhaps the most traditional method of improving compliance
with legal and regulatory requirements is to increase penalties for
violations. In the mining industry, however, severe penalties for violations are already part of the established legal framework.257 Operating
a mine in violation of the CWA, for example, results in “civil penalties of
up to $25,000 per day” and potential criminal penalties “of up to $50,000
per day.”258 These rates frequently translate into exorbitant fines.259 In
2008, for example, Massey Energy, a coal mining company operating in
West Virginia, was fined $20 million for what the federal government
determined were some 4600 violations of the CWA.260 Despite these
penalties, violations continue to occur.261
Perhaps a better way of approaching the problem of law enforcement is to make it easier to detect violations. Currently, one of the
obstacles precluding stringent enforcement is the difficulty of interpreting certain provisions of the laws expressed through qualitative descriptions rather than strict quantitative limits.262 For example, one of the
provisions of the SMCRA and its associated administrative rules and
regulations conditions approval of mining permits on a finding by the
regulatory authorities that “the proposed operation ‘has been designed
to prevent material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit
area.’ ”263 However, no definition as to what constitutes “material damage” is provided.264 Similarly, the SMCRA does not currently impose
quantitative limits on the size of valley fills, the amount of watershed
that can be disturbed by mining operations, or the total number of miles
of streams that can be covered by overburden at any one time.265 The lack
of precise quantitative limits makes violations harder to detect.
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The OSM is currently entertaining the idea of changing these and
other provisions of the SMCRA regulations in order to provide more
exacting definitions and precise quantitative limits.266 Similarly, the EPA
has begun to endorse more quantitative measures of acceptable levels of
damage under the CWA.267 However, such changes are necessarily
constrained by the level of available science and technology.268 While
inviting comments on relevant advances in science, the OSM remarked
that as of 2005, “existing studies provided an insufficient basis to determine a bright-line threshold of the nature described in this alternative.”269
In conclusion, despite the imperfections of these measures as the
be-all and end-all solutions to law enforcement problems, both increasing
civil and criminal penalties, and enhancing the capacity for detection of
violations by adopting more quantitatively precise regulations, have the
potential of ameliorating some of the disastrous effects of MTR. Additionally, increasing the government’s budget devoted to inspections of mining
operations could facilitate an improvement in law enforcement.
C.

Facilitating Judicial Action

Although a complete discussion of the complexities of environmental citizen suits and standing issues is beyond the scope of this note, it is
worth pointing out that there are numerous obstacles precluding more
prominent action in the judicial arena with respect to MTR.270 One such
obstacle involves the inability, according to a ruling by the Fourth Circuit, of a federal court to issue a permanent injunction against a state
official in a citizen suit under the SMCRA.271 In fact, this issue is what
precluded the Fourth Circuit from ever reaching the substantive arguments made in Bragg v. Robertson, arguments that would otherwise have
had a significant impact on MTR policy and practice.272
Another obstacle to judicial action is the potential for preclusion
of citizen suits in cases when administrative action under the CWA has
already been initiated by an administrative agency, even when such
266
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action is “de minimus . . . such as writing a letter expressing interest in
investigating a mining permit.”273 In the context of concerns over agency
capture by the coal industry,274 and given the usual lack of agency resources, citizen suits should be allowed to proceed concurrently with
government investigations, so long as careful measures are taken to
ensure that there are no duplicative penalties.275
Facilitating judicial action by removing some of these obstacles
could result in significant advances for MTR jurisprudence. Creating an
avenue for judicial recourse to the MTR problem is especially important
because of the relative stability that accompanies a judicial decision as
opposed to administrative agency action or rule-making.276 As discussed
previously, administrative actions and regulations are too frequently
vulnerable to political influence and susceptible to change concurrent
with changing administrations.277 A policy based on judicial interpretation
of a congressional statute, on the other hand, could potentially provide
an effective justification for stable and consistent administrative action.
D.

Severing Connections Between Industry and Policymakers

As previously described, financial ties between the coal industry
and policymakers exacerbate the already difficult process of implementing policy changes towards a reduced impact of MTR.278 Although the
interests of the coal industry are certainly important to any debate on
MTR and should be taken into account, they should not be allowed to
drive policy at the expense of the interests of the larger public, and
particularly those of the communities neighboring mining sites.
Stringent policies with regard to campaign financing should be
implemented to prevent any temptation for bias by any official involved
in MTR policy, be that a governor, a legislator, or an officer of the
court.279 Furthermore, bringing increased public attention to the issue by
exposing the financial ties between the coal industry and policymakers
through mass media could serve as a powerful tool for change. To this
goal, MTR policy would benefit from a collaboration between leading
273
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environmental organizations, such as Earthjustice,280 and organizations
involved in policing campaign financing, such as the National Institute
on Money in State Politics.281
E.

Focusing on Reclamation

One possible way to ameliorate the destructive environmental
impact of MTR is through increased reliance on science in improving
post-mining reclamation and mitigation procedures. Currently, deforestation and stream destruction, combined with the accompanying loss of
ecosystems and biodiversity, constitute the greatest threats to the environment caused by MTR.282 Although the SMCRA requires that mined
land be returned to its approximate original contour, which includes
reestablishing a vegetative cover,283 many mining companies find ways
to go around the law; for example, by declaring bankruptcy and avoiding
reclamation altogether, or by reclaiming the land in ineffective ways,
such as planting cheap weeds where beautiful forests once stood.284
Strengthening law enforcement with respect to reclamation,285 as well as
increasing investment in scientific research aimed at improving currently available reclamation techniques, can have profound consequences
on the environment.
Science has the theoretical potential of providing the only mutually acceptable compromise to the environment-coal dilemma. In an age
when genetics is part of our everyday lives, scientists clone sheep, and
engineers construct “green buildings,” it is particularly hard to accept
that reclamation science is in as poor condition as it is. If Dubai can build
luscious green oases in the middle of the desert286 and ski slopes in the
middle of malls,287 why can’t we figure out how to reclaim a mountain?
280
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Unfortunately, recent scientific data suggest that fully reversing
the environmental damage from MTR may never be possible.288 A study
published in the magazine Science in January 2010 concluded that the
“preponderance of scientific evidence” shows that MTR’s environmental
impacts are “pervasive and irreversible and that mitigation cannot
compensate for losses.”289 According to Margaret Palmer, a leading
environmental scientist with expertise on stream ecosystems and restoration ecology, neither of the two methods currently utilized for mitigating
MTR’s environmental damage to waterways—stream creation and stream
restoration—has proven to work.290 In fact, “there is not a single study in
the peer-reviewed literature providing evidence that streams created for
mitigation replace the functions and structures of natural headwater
streams.”291 Given these constraints, it might make more sense to invest
money in offsetting any potential economic loss resulting from a ban on
MTR than to put it in further studies of reclamation science in hope for a
scientific miracle.
F.

Re-conceptualizing MTR in Public Health Terms

One other approach to MTR that has not been widely adopted,
except by a few public health scientists,292 is to rephrase the problem
from environmental terms into public health terms. Although the environmental degradation caused by MTR is most certainly devastating,
conceptualizing the problem in strictly environmental terms allows us to
shrug off some of the urgency that is necessary for an effective solution.
Regrettable as this may be, most people tend to think of environmental problems as ones with primarily long-term consequences that do
not usually affect our everyday lives directly.293 Although a heightened
environmental consciousness is certainly beginning to emerge in our
society, the average person is still unlikely to really start worrying about
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climate change before something drastic and immediate happens,294 say
for example, the California coast starts sinking. Similarly, while there is
still water running in our faucets and electricity lighting up our homes,
the few hundreds of miles of streams and mountaintops lost during MTR
can become a speculative and distant threat. This allows us to misconstrue
and ignore the true magnitude of the problems with MTR.
Instead of waiting for environmental consciousness to progress to
a level when everyone would care about even a single mountain lost,
what we can do, and do now, is re-conceptualize MTR as a problem of
public health. Most people may not care about trees, and water, and
mountaintops,295 but they certainly do care about other people dying.
And, people in Appalachia are dying.296 In addition to the health hazards
usually associated with the practice of coal mining, such as black lung
disease, MTR causes a myriad of health problems for the communities
neighboring mining sites.297 Constant exposure to dust particles caused
by explosion blasts results in unprecedented levels of chronic disease.298
A risk increase of sixty-four percent for chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease and seventy percent for kidney disease299 is not only disturbing, it
is immediate, urgent, and unacceptable.
Re-conceptualizing the problem in public health terms can have
numerous consequences for MTR policy. For example, it would allow
direct and increased regulation of mining operators by the federal
Department of Health and Human Services and its respective state
counterparts. In an approach similar to that of the EPA in requiring
environmental impact assessments for water pollution permits, these
agencies could require coal operators to conduct human health impact
assessments prior to the beginning and throughout the duration of
mining operations. Threshold levels of public health risk can be set, and
severe criminal and civil penalties can be imposed for violations. Furthermore, as a public health parallel to current environmental mitigation
and reclamation requirements, the agencies could require coal operators
to implement a variety of human health mitigation procedures. These
could include paying for scientific and medical research on diseases
294
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associated with MTR, improving healthcare access by setting up clinics
and other treatment facilities in Appalachia, and paying for preventative
as well as curative healthcare services in the neighboring communities.
This approach would effectively require coal mining operators to internalize some of the exorbitant healthcare costs of MTR.
Currently, it is difficult to determine the most effective means for
achieving such re-conceptualization and to assess with any certainty the
feasibility of this approach. Regardless, because of this approach’s unique
emphasis on human health and its potential to deliver relief to those who
need it most—the Appalachian human communities—action can and should
be taken. By a combination of grass-roots campaigning, political lobbying,
the democratic process of electing officials, and judicial enforcement of
tort liability, we can fight to ameliorate the effects of MTR on the people
of Appalachia.
G.

Complete Ban of Mountaintop Removal

Many have argued, and argued fervently, for a complete ban of
MTR.300 In essence, this is the only true solution for the problem, the one
that will obviate the need for all the proposed changes discussed above.
But is it feasible?
When analyzing the proposal for banning MTR, it is imperative
to keep in mind that this is not a proposal for banning coal mining as a
whole, or even the majority of it. Over half the electricity used in our
nation comes from coal.301 It will be far too naïve to even suggest the
possibility of eliminating coal as an energy resource. But, as our President has stated, the coal that we do produce has to be “clean coal.”302 I
hope this note has shown that there is nothing clean about MTR coal.
The only conceivable argument against banning MTR is based on
the economic impact that such a ban could have on the Appalachian
communities and our nation as a whole in terms of lost energy resources,
lost tax revenues, and lost jobs. These are addressed in turn below.
300
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With regard to lost energy resources, it helps to keep in mind that
less than five percent of the total coal produced in the United States
comes from MTR mining.303 Therefore, banning MTR is projected to have
only marginal effects on overall coal extraction.304 Furthermore, banning
MTR will not preclude coal mining using a variety of alternative methods. Although such methods might be more expensive, the corresponding
increase of electricity prices would likely be negligible, given the small
percentage of coal currently produced by MTR.305 Furthermore, prices of
electricity are already artificially deflated because they do not take into
account the “hidden costs” of coal to human health and human lives.306
On a more philosophical level, the idea of securing the cheapest possible
electricity can itself be challenged on the grounds that it disincentivizes
conservation, efficiency, sustainability, and development of renewable
energy sources.307
With regard to revenues generated by coal taxes, it is difficult to
estimate how much money comes from MTR as opposed to other coal
mining methods.308 In any case, however, an argument for a substantial
impact of banning MTR on tax revenues necessarily relies on the idea
that the amount of coal produced by MTR and hence the corresponding
tax revenues will not be replaced by coal produced by alternative mining
methods. There is no reason to assume this is so.
With regard to employment, the data show that because of MTR’s
technological advances in efficient utilization of machinery over people,
MTR mining has actually resulted in a net loss of mining jobs.309 In
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Kentucky, for example, the shift from traditional mining to MTR caused
a decrease in coal jobs of approximately sixty percent.310 These data have
obliterating effects on any argument rooted in the idea that banning
MTR would result in an unacceptable impact on local rates of employment.
A recent study on behalf of Coal River Mountain Watch provides
an instructive response to concerns over the loss of energy, tax revenues,
and jobs associated with MTR.311 The study examined three different
scenarios for energy development of Coal River Mountain in Raleigh
County, West Virginia—two involving wind energy and one involving
MTR—and compared the economic benefits and costs under each scenario.312 The data showed that the economic benefits of the wind scenarios
far exceeded those of the MTR scenario, with twenty-eight percent to
three-hundred fourteen percent more jobs depending on which of the
wind energy scenarios was implemented, and with over $1 million more
tax revenues per year.313 The authors thus concluded that “the mountaintop removal scenario is not defensible from the perspective of Raleigh
County citizens . . . .”314
On a final note, the correlation between poverty and coal production
in Appalachia315 suggests that “a continued reliance on the coal industry
is not a viable option for long-term sustainable economic development.”316
Dependence on coal seems to be Appalachia’s problem, not its solution.
It contributes to health deterioration, both indirectly by virtue of pollution and environmental degradation,317 and directly because mining is one
of the most hazardous jobs in the United States;318 it promotes the exploitation of labor by a greedy and largely foreign state-owned319 industry, which
310
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reaps economic benefits at the expense of local mining communities who
get little more than a living wage;320 it contributes to a poor educational
level because a high school diploma is hardly necessary for a mining
job;321 and it jeopardizes the efficiency of the democratic and political
processes of the state.322 What Appalachia needs is new horizons, new
industries, new jobs, and a complete restructuring of the economy in a
way that will be sustainable in the long run.323 In this sense too, banning
MTR may ultimately prove to be more beneficial than detrimental to
Appalachia’s economy. It is thus the conclusion of this author that the
obstacles that stand in the way of full MTR ban are political rather than
practical in nature and driven by a largely self-serving coal industry.
CONCLUSION
MTR impacts the environment and public health in devastating
and unacceptable ways as mountains tumble, waterways vanish, ecosystems degrade, and people die. Regulation of the practice has not been
successful in adequately addressing all aspects of the problem or controlling the rate of degradation caused by MTR. Urgent policy changes are
needed to ensure that when we wake up tomorrow, the treasure in our
backyard that is the Appalachian mountains will still be there.
The goal of this note has been not only to expose the devastating
effects of MTR but also to illuminate the many different and intricately
interwoven social, political, legal, scientific, and economic forces at play
contributing to the disaster. A multifaceted problem requires a multifaceted solution. It is therefore imperative that in order for some measurable amount of change to occur we adopt a multi-institutional approach,
affecting all levels of government and society. Nothing less than the
concerted action of legislative, regulatory, political, economic, scientific,
and social reform will suffice in the effort to preserve Appalachia.
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